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Bodily selves in relation: embodied
simulation as second-person perspective
on intersubjectivity
Vittorio Gallese
Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, 43125 Parma, Italy
This article addresses basic aspects of social cognition focusing on the pivo-
tal role played by the lived body in the constitution of our experience of
others. It is suggested that before studying intersubjectivity we should
better qualify the notion of the self. A minimal notion of the self, the
bodily self, defined in terms of its motor potentialities, is proposed. The dis-
covery of mirror mechanisms for action, emotions and sensations led to the
proposal of an embodied approach to intersubjectivity—embodied simu-
lation (ES) theory. ES and the related notion of neural reuse provide a
new empirically based perspective on intersubjectivity, viewed first and
foremost as intercorporeality. ES challenges the notion that folk psychology
is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. ES is discussed within a
second-person perspective on mindreading.
1. Introduction
What we commonly mean by ‘understand’ coincides with ‘simplify’ [...]: with this
purpose in view we have built for ourselves admirable tools in the course of evol-
ution, tools which are the specific property of the human species – language and
conceptual thought. [1, p. 36]
One of the core objectives of cognitive neuroscience is to understand the
relationship between the functional mechanisms of our brain–body system
and our social cognitive skills, shedding new light on the notion of intersubjec-
tivity. However, the notion of intersubjectivity is intrinsically related to the
notion of the self. Thus, the neuroscientific study of intersubjectivity cannot
elude the issue of subjectivity and of the experiences constituting it. In this
paper, I discuss the relation between intersubjectivity and a minimal notion
of the self, the bodily self.
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the enormous progress
of cognitive neuroscience, also fostered by the development of new technol-
ogies like brain imaging, enabling for the first time a thorough non-invasive
study of the human brain. Since then, cognitive neuroscience has started
addressing topics related to social cognition, such as intersubjectivity, the
self, empathy, free will, decision-making, ethics and aesthetics, many of
which were traditionally the object of investigation of different disciplines,
such as psychology, philosophy, economy and politics. These recent develop-
ments are stirring an ever-growing debate on the heuristic value of cognitive
neuroscience when applied to these topics.
At this point, a crucial question is perhaps worth being asked: what is cog-
nitive neuroscience after all? Cognitive neuroscience is first and foremost a
methodological approach whose empirical results are strongly influenced by
the assumptions posed by the theoretical framework inspiring its very same
approach. The scientific investigation of single neurons and/or of brain areas
does not necessarily prefigure either the questions cognitive neuroscience
addresses to the brain or their answers.
Some quarters of cognitive neuroscience are still today strongly influenced, on
theonehand,byclassiccognitivismand,ontheother,byevolutionarypsychology.
Broadlyspeaking, classiccognitivescienceendorses a methodologicallysolipsistic
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ual’s mind is all one needs to define what the mind is and
how it works. Indeed, according to classic cognitive science,
the mind basically is a functional system whose processes can
be described in terms of symbolic information processing,
according to a series of formal syntactical rules. Understanding
others would square with representing in propositional format
in one’s mind, the propositional contents of others’ minds.
According to evolutionary psychology, the human mind
can be conceived of as a conglomerate of cognitive modules,
selected in the course of evolution because of their adaptive
value. Prominent figures of evolutionary psychology like
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby went as far as arguing that
the brain is a physical system working like a computer [2],
while according to Steven Pinker [3,4] our cognitive life can
be reduced to the functioning of a series of modules, like
the language module, the theory of mind module, etc.
On the basis of this composite theoretical framework, it is
no surprise that many cognitive neuroscientists during the last
20 years, when investigating social cognition, mainly aimed at
localizing in the human brain the above-mentioned cognitive
modules, thus implicitly—when not even explicitly—relying
on the views heralded by classic cognitive science and evol-
utionary psychology. This approach can be characterized as
a form of ontological reductionism, which treats the individ-
ual—the self—as a mass of information-processing neural
networks. Such a reduction also suffers from an excessive
reliance on brain imaging as the sole method of investigation.
The point is that functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) by itself falls short of enabling a thorough picture of
how the brain works, unless its correlational data are bench-
marked with the more finely grained invasive sub-personal
level of investigation, consisting in the recording of single
neurons in non-human primates or—more rarely—in
humans. Furthermore, if brain imaging is not complemented
with a detailed phenomenological analysis of the perceptual,
motor and cognitive processes it aims at investigating, and,
most importantly, if brain imaging results are not interpreted
on the basis of our knowledge of clinical neuropsychological
cases, this approach loses much of its potential heuristic
value (for similar views, see [5]).
Here, I propose an alternative—or, at the very least, comp-
lementary—approach to the study of social cognition, which
focuses on the pivotal role played by the lived body in the con-
stitution of the way we understand the world of others. Such a
bottom-up approach can shed new light on the genesis of the
self and intersubjectivity by relying on a methodological
reductionism that does not sacrifice the rich experience we
make use of in our daily transactions with the world. To
solve the problem of what it means to be a human subject, a
self-reflective self, we should not consider the brain in iso-
lation, but focus on its tight interrelated connections with the
body. We should also abandon the solipsistic stance and
address the issue from a social point of view.
The hypothesis developed in this article rests on four pre-
mises: (i) the minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, tacitly
presupposes ownership of an action-capable agentive entity.
Hence, this primitive sense of the self primarily rests on the
workings of the motor system. As it will be shown, empirical
evidence supports the neural realization of this implicit aspect
of selfhood in the brain’s motor cortex. (ii) As minimal bodily
selfhood rests neurally and psychologically on the motor
system, it logically follows that characteristics of the latter are
defining for the former. That is, minimal bodily selfhood
could be attributed to known features of the motor system,
including its capacities and limitations. (iii) One of the relevant
features of a prominent component of the motor system, the
mirror neurons mechanism, is that it is active during both per-
formance and perception of goal-directed action. This
mechanism underpins one way—likely the most basic and
direct one—of understanding the goals of others’ motor be-
haviour. (iv) The motor aspects of the bodily self provide the
means to integrate self-related multimodal sensory infor-
mation about the body and the world it interacts with.
Resting on the above four premises, it could be inferred
that the minimal bodily selfhood has a dual function. On the
one hand, it constitutes the basic sense of the self. On
the other, it shapes our perception and pre-reflective con-
ception of others as other selves incarnated in a motorly
capable physical body with capacities and experiences similar
to ours. Through the bodily self’s resonance, others become
second selves, or second persons
1 and this is a more vivid
experience of intersubjectivity, relative to the detached,
propositional deliberation on the experiences of others.
I challenge the standard solipsistic theoretical account of
intersubjectivity offered by classic cognitive science, capitaliz-
ing upon a new take on intersubjectivity, as defined by the
second-person perspective. The second-person perspective
offers a different and deflationary epistemic approach to the
problem of other minds, by reducing the mental gap that
supposedly separates them. Some wide-ranging implications
of this model are briefly discussed.
In the following sections, I introduce motor cognition,
mirror neurons and the mirror mechanism (MM) in
humans. I discuss the role in intersubjectivity of a minimal
notion of the self, the bodily self, and propose a second-
person perspective of intersubjectivity. I conclude by briefly
discussing some of the challenges this model is facing.
2. Motor cognition
For many years, the cortical motor system was conceived of as
the neural controller of elementary physical features
of movement, such as force, direction and amplitude. On a
theoretical level, however, many scholars in the past empha-
sized the strict connection between movement and cognition.
The German psychiatrist and philosopher Erwin Straus, for
example, pointed out that even the apparently simplest form
of human behaviour enabled by the motor system, like keep-
ing an upright position, can be directly connected to its
metaphorical extensions (e.g. ‘an upright member of the com-
munity’) [6]. Such connection is made possible by humans’
structural project (Bauplan), that is, by human bodily nature.
According to Straus, bipedalism and the conquest of the
upright position not only redefined the function of human sen-
sory organs, such asthe eyes and the ears, and surrendered the
hand from its role of supporting the body, enabling its fullest
expressive power, but also deeply changed humans’ stance
towards the physical world, which could be finally viewed
from a distance, henceforth objectified.
In spite of such theoretical anticipations, it took quite a
while for neuroscience to even conceive of the possibility of
assigning a cognitive role to the motor system. The classic
picture of the motor system as a mere movement controller
radically changed on the discovery that many cortical
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elementary movements, but are active before and during
motor acts—movements executed to accomplish a specific
motor goal—such as grasping, tearing, holding or manipulat-
ing objects [7–9]. The motor goal-relatedness of cortical
premotor neurons is independent of the hand movements
required to accomplish the goal [10,11]. Teleology made its
way into the cortical motor system.
A further element of novelty about the functional proper-
ties of the cortical motor system concerns its role in
perception, as we now know that it is indeed endowed with
sensory properties. Several studies consistently showed that
premotor and parietal areas contain neurons that perceptually
respond to visual, auditory and somatosensory inputs
[7,8,12–19]. Altogether, these findings led to the formulation
of the ‘motor cognition’ hypothesis as a leading element for
the emergence of social cognition [20,21]. According to this
hypothesis, cognitive abilities like the hierarchical represen-
tation of action with respect to a distal goal, the detection of
motor goals and action anticipation are possible because of
the peculiar functional architecture of the motor system, orga-
nized in terms of goal-directed motor acts. The proper
development of such functional architecture likely scaffolds
more cognitively sophisticated social cognitive abilities.
A peculiar example is offered by macaque monkeys’ ven-
tral premotor area F4 [22], part of a parieto-premotor cortical
network mapping specific sensory events in the space near
the body onto the neural representation of arm and head
motor acts [23]. F4 neurons not only control orienting/avoid-
ance movements of the head and reaching movements of
the upper limb, they also respond to tactile stimuli applied
to the same body parts whose movements they control, and
to visual and auditory stimuli, provided they occur within
the monkey’s peripersonal space. F4 neurons’ visual and audi-
tory receptive fields are somatocentred, that is, they are
anchored to body parts and move along with them. Thus, per-
ceiving a visual object or hearing a sound within peripersonal
space evokes the motor simulation of the most appropriate
actions towards that very same spatial location [24,25].
Most interestingly, several studies identified a putative
human homologue of monkey area F4 in the premotor cortex.
Bremmer et al. [26] demonstrated that the ventral aspect of
human premotor cortex responds to tactile stimuli applied to
the face and to visual and auditory stimuli presented within
its peripersonal space. Furthermore, repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) over premotor cortex interferes
with the processing of multisensory stimuli within the hand’s
peripersonal space [27]. These results show that the cortical
motor system both in non-human primates and humans
maps the body’s motor potentialities and that such mapping
enables the multisensory integration of self bodily related
stimuli affecting the body and its surrounding space.
Let us now address some of the neural mechanisms
enabling intersubjectivity and mutual understanding, by
introducing mirror neurons in macaques, MMs in humans
and embodied simulation (ES).
3. Mirror neurons, mirror mechanisms in humans
and embodied simulation
Mirrorneurons areanotherclassofmultimodal motor neurons.
They were originally discovered in ventral premotor area F5 of
macaque monkeys [28–30]. Mirror neurons are activated not
only when a monkey performs a particular object-related
action, but also when observing someone else performing the
same action. Also for macaques’ mirror neurons, what really
matter are not specific movements, but the motor goal that
movements are supposed to accomplish [29]. Neurons with
similar properties were also found in regions of the inferior par-
ietal lobe [31,32], reciprocally connected with area F5 [23]. The
intensity of mirror neurons’ discharge is significantly stronger
during action execution than during action observation [11].
Thus, the MM is not opaque to the issue of agency, that is, it
implicitly discriminates between who is the agent and who is
the observer.
Since their very discovery, mirror neurons were inter-
preted as enabling a direct form of understanding others’
motor behaviour [28–30], while arguing that the mere
visual description of others’ motor behaviour cannot account
for its goal-relatedness [33]. According to the same proposal,
the relational character of behaviour as mapped by the corti-
cal motor system would enable the appreciation of purpose
without relying on explicit inference.
Many studies employing different methodologies,
including fMRI, positron emission tomography (PET), magne-
toencephalography (MEG), electroencephalography (EEG),
TMS and single neurons recordings, revealed also in humans
a MM mapping the perception of others’ motor behaviour
onto motor representations of the observers’ brain [34–37]. A
distinctive feature of the MMfor movement inhumans consists
initsmuchwiderscope.Differingfrommacaques,motorreson-
ance in humans can be evoked not only by the execution/
observation of goal-directed motor acts, but also by simple
movements, like raising one’s arm, jumping or flexing one’s
finger.Thiswider‘motorpalette’likelyplayedaroleinfostering
the distinctive mimetic nature of the human species. Indeed, in
order to imitate someone else’s behaviour, one needs to copy
not only the motor goal of the observed behaviour but also its
means, that is, the movements allowing its accomplishment.
The MM for movement in humans can do both.
Very early on, it was hypothesized that the MM for move-
ment might have been just the tip of a much bigger iceberg
[38,39]. Indeed, numerous neurophysiological, neuroimaging
and behavioural studies confirmed the initial hypothesis that
a similar MM could underpin the social perception of others’
bodily experiences and mental states [38]. Indeed, the same
cortical regions underlying the experience of emotions and
sensations are also activated when witnessing others’ emotions
[40–43]andsensations,suchastouch[44–48],pain[49–53]and
pleasant touch [54]. Furthermore, it has been recently shown
that action and emotion are not segregated domains, as the
emotion dynamically expressed by the face of an observed
agent modulates the cortical motor circuits activated during
the perception of her/his grasping action [55]. These results
show that the MM is modulated by the affective state of
others: the emotional context is combined with the motor rep-
resentation of the observed action at the level of the cortical
motor system. The observed dynamic facial expression of
others thus modulates the ES of the observed action.
The theory of ES [25,37,39] provides a unified theoretical
framework for all of these phenomena. It proposes that our
social interactions become meaningful by means of reusing
our own mental states or processes in functionally attributing
them to others. In this context, simulation is conceived of as a
non-conscious, pre-reflective functional mechanism of the
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agents and events. This mechanism can be triggered during
our interactions with others, but is also plastically modulated
by contextual, cognitive and personal identity-related factors.
ES theory challenges the notion that the sole account of inter-
subjectivity consists in explicitly attributing to others
propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires, mapped
as symbolic representations. As previously argued, before
and below mindreading is intercorporeality as the main
source of knowledge we directly gather about others [56].
AspointedoutbyDePreester[57],followingtheFrenchphi-
losopher Merleau-Ponty, the body of intercorporeality is
primarily perceivedasasystematicmeanstogotowardsobjects.
This isthereason why, argues De Presteer, ‘the other isseen as a
behavior and the “I” is primarily a “motor I”’ [57, p. 137]. This
perspective on simulation holds that the same neural structures
involved in our own bodily self-experiences are also reused
when facing others, enabling the pre-reflective understanding
oftheirbehavioursandofsomeoftheirmentalstates,thusintro-
ducing a novel conceptualization of simulation with respect to
its standard account in the philosophy of mind [58].
What and who are the selves relating to one another in the
course of human interpersonal relationships? To address
these questions, we should focus upon the multilevel notions
of the self.
4. From the bodily self to intersubjectivity
The Danish psychiatrist Josef Parnas, building upon a phe-
nomenological perspective, identified three levels specifying
the self [59,60]. The first level consists in the implicit aware-
ness that any of our experiences are ‘ours’, defined as
‘ipseity’. The second level consists of the more explicit aware-
ness of being the invariant subject of experience and action.
Finally, the third level pertains to the social or narrative
self. The first level has been variously identified with the
notions of ‘core self’ or ‘minimal self’. A bottom-up approach
to intersubjectivity could thus benefit from the empirical
investigation of the elements allowing the emergence of
implicit and pre-reflective self-knowledge.
Most research on the self employs the notions of bodyown-
ership, sense of agency and first-person perspective. Body
ownership refers to the perceptual status of one’s own body,
which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself [61].
Empirical evidence shows that the experience of our body as
ourownmainlyreliesonmultisensoryintegration,which,how-
ever, is conditioned by the possibility—or not—to perform
actions with a given body part [62,63]. Sense of agency refers
tothesenseofbeingtheonewhogeneratestheaction.Werecog-
nize ourselves as agents when we experience congruence
between self-generated movements and their expected conse-
quences. However, as argued by Marc Jeannerod [64], the
sense of agency also arises in situations where action represen-
tation is formed, but no movement is executed. As frequently
actions in our daily life remain covert, the existence of overt be-
haviour should not be a prerequisite for self-identification. This
form of motor simulation occurs, for example, in the case of
mental motor imagery [65], when perceiving perceptual
events within our peripersonal space with the activation of F4
neurons or of their human homologue, or during the obser-
vation of others’ actions with the activation of the MM as its
neural counterpart. First-person perspective, finally, refers to
the fact that the world appears to be constrained by a mobile
bodilyself, that is, by the situated point of view, the orientation
and the attitudes proper of the self’s sensorimotor background
capacities[66].Thus,manynotionsadoptedtoanswertheques-
tionofhowwedistinguishourselvesasbodilyselvesfromother
human bodies refer to a crucial role of the motor system.
Indeed, it was proposed that there is a sense of body,
enactive in nature, which enables one to capture the most
primitive sense of self as bodily self [67,68]. Our body is pri-
marily given to us as source or power for action. Our body is
experienced as specifying the variety of motor potentialities
defining the horizon of the world we interact with. This is
what Straus’s notion of Bauplan refers to [6]. Such a primitive
sense of self as bodily self is conceived of as being antecedent
to the distinction between senses of agency and ownership.
One may easily argue that not all self-experiences tap into
action. Indeed, sensations like being hungry or thirsty are cer-
tainly experienced as belonging to ourselves, in spite of their
not being directly related to action. The point is that in order
to experience these sensations as ours we must presuppose a
sense of self as bodily self to whom these experiences belong.
The relationship between this minimal sense of self and the
cortical motor system was recently revealed. It was shown that
the motor experience of one’s own body, even at a covert level,
allows an implicit and pre-reflective bodily self-knowledge to
emerge,leadingtoaself/other distinction, as measuredbypar-
ticipants’ faster responses during a mental rotation task to
pictures of their dominant hand, with respect to others’ hands
[69]. The same study also showed that when participants were
requested to explicitly discriminate between their hands and
the hands of others, the self-advantage disappeared. Implicit
and explicit recognition of the bodily self dissociate: only
implicit recognition of the bodily self, mapped in motor
terms, facilitates implicit bodily self processing. A subsequent
fMRI study [55] based on a similar hand mental rotation task
showed that a bilateral cortical network formed by the sup-
plementary and pre-supplementary motor areas, the anterior
insula and the occipital cortex activated during processing of
participants’ own hands. Furthermore, the contralateral ventral
premotorcortex was uniquelyand specificallyactivated during
the mental rotation of participants’ own dominant hand. The
authors of this study concluded that the ventral premotor
cortexmightrepresentoneoftheessentialanatomicalandfunc-
tional bases for the motor aspect of bodily selfhood, also in the
light of its role in integrating self-related multisensory infor-
mation. This hypothesis is corroborated by clinical and
functional evidence showing its systematic involvement with
bodyawareness [70–72]. Thus, there seemsto be atightrelation-
ship between the bodily self-related multimodal integration
carried out by the cortical motor areas specifying the motor
potentialities of one’s body and guiding its motor behaviour
and the implicit awareness one entertains of one’s body as
one’s own bodyand of one’s behaviouras one’s own behaviour.
After having clarified some basic aspects of a minimal
notion of the self as bodily self, I turn now to a second-person
perspective to intersubjectivity.
5. I and you: a second-person perspective to
intersubjectivity
When meeting others, we can relate to them in the detached
way, typical of an external observer. We can ‘objectively’
r
s
t
b
.
r
o
y
a
l
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
.
o
r
g
P
h
i
l
.
T
r
a
n
s
.
R
.
S
o
c
.
B
3
6
9
:
2
0
1
3
0
1
7
7
4
 on April 28, 2014 rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Downloaded from explain others, reflect, and formulate judgements, categorize
their actions, emotions and sensations by adopting a third-
person perspective, aimed at objectifying the content of our
perceptions and predictions. The purpose of such cognitive
operations is the deliberate categorization of an external
state of affairs, that is, the mental representations of others.
However, we do not only mentally entertain an ‘objective’
third-person account of what others are, do to us and with us.
When relating to others, we also experience them as bodily
selves, similar to how we experience ourselves as the owners
of our body and the authors of our actions. When exposed
to others’ expressive behaviours, reactions and inclinations,
we simultaneously experience their goal-directedness and
intentional character, as we experience ourselves as the
agents of our actions, the subjects of our affects, feelings and
emotions, the owners of our thoughts, fantasies, imaginations
and dreams.
All of these peculiar qualities of our social transactions
qualify as ingredients of the so-called second-person perspec-
tive on intersubjectivity.
2 This approach differs from the
third-person approach because it specifies a radically differ-
ent and deflationary epistemic approach to the problem of
other minds, as it greatly reduces the mental gap supposedly
separating us from others.
The three minimal requirements any epistemic approach
should meet in order to be qualified as second-person were
recently outlined by the German philosopher Michael
Pauen [73, pp. 38–39]. First, it has to draw on a replication
or imagination of the mental state to be recognized; second,
it must include a self/other distinction, so that the epistemic
subject is aware that the state being replicated belongs to the
other; third, it must allow the epistemic subject to recognize
his epistemic situation as different from that of the other
person. It must be emphasized that these requirements do
not presuppose any explicit awareness. Indeed, as pointed
out by Pauen [73], ‘it seems that they are automatic and sub-
conscious to a large extent’ (p. 43). I posit that all three
requirements are compatible with the neuroscientific account
of the basic aspects of intersubjectivity outlined here. As
briefly reviewed in the previous sections, ES and its under-
pinning MMs provide, on the one hand, a sub-personal
characterization of what enables an empathic sharing of
others’ states based on vicarious brain activity in the sensor-
imotor and visceromotor systems while, on the other, they are
sensitive to self-other discrimination (see also below).
All of our social relationships can be lived and experi-
enced in different ways. What changes is our attitude
towards others. The German philosopher and theologian
Martin Buber (1878–1965), a precursor of the second-person
perspective on intersubjectivity, in his seminal book I and
Thou (Ich und Du, [74]) posited that human interpersonal
relations can be third-person relations, i.e. I-it (and I-She,
I-He) or second-person relations, i.e. I-you. We can relate to
the same individual like a thing among other things or like
our beloved one. Even our beloved one, though, occasionally
can be for us a ‘She’ or ‘He’ or even an ‘it’, an object. The
other can in fact be conceived of as an instrument, for
example by informing us about some state of affairs in
the world, or by helping us through those affairs. In other
words, one can relate to another human being similarly to
when one relates to inanimate objects. Thus, the choice is
not between a second- and third-person perspective, because
as human beings we clearly entertain both. We are beginning
to understand what are the sub-personal neural mechanisms
enabling the former, while we still know very little about
those enabling the latter.
AccordingtoBuber [74], thefull-blownI onlyemerges once
one perceives oneself as a you, when interpersonal dialogue
turns into a self-centred inner dialogue. Indeed, as infant
research clearly demonstrated, the rhythm, synchronicity and
asynchronous engagements humans systematically experience
from the very beginning in every inter-human relationship
mark the birth of intersubjectivity ([75–78], see also [79]).
It should be added that Buber’s account of intersubjectivity
prefigures Stein Bra ˚ten’s notion of alter-centric participation,
that is, the innate capacity of experiencing what the other is
experiencing, as being centred in the other [80–82].
As the longing for relation is primary, as infant research
has copiously shown, the you of the interpersonal dyad
could be initially viewed as the outcome of the appetitive
motivational (or seeking) system,
3 conceptualized as the
functional network evoking appetitive eagerness [83,84],
coupled with a relationally programmed motor system
[8,85]. This basic ‘package’ would enable the parallel genesis
of the I and of his/her objects. In sum, currently available
neuroscientific evidence seems to allow a sub-personal
description—albeit a still sketchy one—of some of the
neural mechanisms enabling and underpinning basic forms
of intersubjectivity, based on partly shared brain circuits.
These circuits can allow for vicarious experience of the
other as another self, while at the same time preserving
the self/other distinction.
6. Embodied simulation as reuse, bodily self and
bodily other: challenges and answers
The present hypothesis faces several challenges. First,
because it proposes a primacy of the bodily self in social cog-
nition, a discussion of alternative perspectives that emphasize
the primacy of social cognition on the development of the self
is in order. Second, the MMs and ES are interpreted as instan-
tiations of neural reuse, that is, as the dual firing pattern/
activation profile of a given group of mirror neurons/brain
areas, which occurs in different situations, like executing an
action and witnessing its execution by others. As such dual
firing is not an exclusive property of mirror neurons (e.g. it
is shown also by canonical neurons, motor neurons firing
both during object manipulation and object observation),
one should clarify what the neural reuse notion entails.
Third, the present hypothesis proposes the centrality of
action and of the motor system in generating the bodily
self. However, MMs and ES are not confined to the domain
of action, because they can be detected also with emotions
and sensations. How can this evidence be reconciled with
the centrality of motor cognition? Finally, how and why are
the MMs and ES relevant to the specific issue of self/other
similarity and difference?
Let us address first the debated primacy either of the self
or of intersubjectivity in social cognition. It was proposed
that the perception of the other is what leads to a sense of
embodied selfhood; in other words, according to this view,
it would be the other to model the self and not the self to
model the other. Tomasello [86], among others, when propos-
ing the notion of ‘shared intentionality’, seems to endorse this
perspective and explicitly advocate the primacy of social
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According to Tomasello, social interactions leading to
affiliative and cooperative behaviours are distinctively
human and experienced as intrinsically rewarding, because
of the uniquely human drive to cooperate and share goals
and intentions.
I do not see Tomasello’s views as potentially contradicting
the hypothesis being discussed here. Indeed, as previously
argued, I think we constantly inhabit a we-centric space [39],
out of which we build, day by day and in constant relation
with others, our own personal identity. In order to share
goals and cooperate, one must understand and discern
others’ goals and realize how one’s behaviour affects others’
actions, emotions and sensations. I think ES is well equipped
to guarantee that, at least at a basic level. Thus, one might
argue that the problem of the primacy either of the self or of
intersubjectivity in social cognition be a false alternative, a
sort of chicken-egg question. Indeed, one of the distinctive fea-
tures of mammals in general, and of primates in particular, is
to be born inside the other and with the other. Self and other
are two self-contrasting notions: there is no self without the
other and vice versa.
Furthermore, the MMs for movement, emotions and sen-
sations can enable a bi-directional, chiasmatic-like relation
between the self and the other. The phenomenon of social
referencing is a good example. When facing a stressful situ-
ation, infants look at their adult carer and quite often the
emotional reaction of the former is modelled upon and mir-
rors that of the latter. As the British paediatrician and
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott famously wrote: ‘What
does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother’s
face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is
himself or herself. In other words, the mother is looking at
baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees
there’ ([87], p. 151).
A similar, although different emphasis on the centrality of
social interactions in social cognition has been advanced by
some proponents of so-called ‘radical enactivism’ (for a
review and thorough criticism of this approach, see [88]).
Briefly, according to this view of social cognition, mental rep-
resentations are entirely superfluous. Social interactions
would not be based upon the sub-personal processes of the
individuals participating to the interaction, but would be
themselves constitutive of individuals’ capacity to under-
stand others’ behaviours, intentions and feelings [89,90].
4
Clearly, in contrast with this version of radical enactivism,
my proposal actually presupposes that social understand-
ing—at least at a basic level—constitutively depends on
the sub-personal representations in bodily format people
entertain of others’ actions, emotions and sensations.
I turn now to the relation among the MM, ES and neural
reuse. For quite a few years [85], I have advocated a role for
exaptation [91] as a key explanatory element of the phylogen-
esis of human social cognition. Exaptation refers to the shift
in the course of evolution of a given trait or mechanism,
which is later on reused to serve new purposes and functions.
According to this view, intentionality, the aboutness of our
representations is—in the first place—an exapted property
of the action models instantiated by the cortical motor
system (see [85], p. 34). The motor system not only houses
causative but also content properties.
I subsequently introduced the notions of ‘neural exploita-
tion’ and ‘neural reuse’ [92,93] to refer to the newly acquired
commitment of sensorimotor neural resources to language
and conceptual thought. Sensorimotor systems, originally
evolved to guide our interactions with the world, once
decoupled from the common final motor pathway and dyna-
mically reconnected with other cortical areas—like, among
others, the prefrontal regions of the brain—can be put into
the service of newly acquired cognitive skills.
This perspective is gaining growing consensus as epitom-
ized by Dehaene’s ‘neuronal recycling’ hypothesis [94], or by
Anderson’s hypothesis on ‘neural reuse’ [95]. How do these
three hypotheses relate to one another? The ‘neuronal recy-
cling’ hypothesis was prompted by the discovery of a
cortical visual area in the human occipito-temporal region
(the visual word form area, VWFA, see [96]) specifically acti-
vated by early perceptual stages of the reading process. Such
specificity is clearly reading-dependent, as it does not show
up in individuals who never learned to read. In these individ-
uals, VWFA is activated by other non-language-related visual
stimuli. As reading and writing are very late cognitive acqui-
sitions of our species, VWFA specificity for reading cannot be
genetically pre-determined, but it rather exemplifies an
instantiation of reuse or ‘recycling’.
This notion of reuse holds that a given brain area’s neural
specialization for processing a certain type of sensory stimuli
can also instantiate a novel use-dependent functional special-
ization for different stimuli of the same sensory modality.
Such a hypothesis does not make any strong evolutionary
claim, as reuse is basically conceived of only at the ontogen-
etic level. Novel cultural habits, such as writing and reading,
have the potentiality to remodel in use-dependent way a
given regional brain function in the course of one individual’s
life by amplifying the set of stimuli belonging to the same
sensory domain it can process.
I applied the notion of neural reuse in relation to the MM
and ES as a general principle of brain function and applied it
to social cognition in general, and to language and concep-
tual thought in particular [92,93]. A similar and more
systematic view was proposed by Anderson [95]. According
to Anderson, by neural reuse different brain areas participate
in different functions through their dynamical engagement
with different brain circuits. Furthermore, a given cognitive
function can be subserved by a variety of brain circuits;
the newer in evolutionary term a cognitive function is, the
wider is the brain circuit underpinning it.
Differing from Dehaene, both Anderson’s and my
hypotheses do make strong evolutionary claims as they
deal with the phylogenesis of human cognitive functions,
challenging the strict adaptationism heralded by evolution-
ary psychology. According to my hypothesis, neural reuse
not only enables the cortical motor system to process and
integrate perceptual stimuli, hence instantiating novel cogni-
tive functions, but also sheds new light on the phylogenesis
and ontogenesis of the vicarious experiences characterizing
human intersubjectivity.
Having clarified the notion of neural reuse here adopted, let
us now address the apparent contradiction between the vicar-
ious experience of others it supposedly enables and the fact
that neural reuse is also instantiated by macaques’ canonical
and F4 neurons and by their human homologues. Does this
entail that when looking at the coffee mug positioned on the
table within my arm’s reach I implicitly assign to it the status
of another bodily self, or worse, that I identify with the coffee
mug? Does this mean that we do have a second-person
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case, unless one subscribed to a sort of neo-Romantic panpsy-
chism. As neural reuse and ES instantiate a general principle
of brain functional organization, they may serve different
purposes. Being a bodily self requires distinctive biological
features inanimate objects are patently devoid of. That said,
it should be added that it is just because of neural reuse
and ES that the space around us and the objects populating
it are constituted as the horizon of our motor potentialities.
As aptly put by Merleau-Ponty, our body ‘provides us with
a way of access to the world and the object, with a praktog-
nosia, which has to be recognized as original and perhaps
as primary’ ([97], p.140)
A similar argument can be used to address the apparent
contradiction between the proposed centrality of action in gen-
erating the bodily self by means of ES and the fact that ES also
applies to emotions and sensations. Centrality does not actu-
ally mean sufficiency. I would rather propose that action is
necessary but not sufficient to generate a full-blown bodily
self. As argued in the Introduction and as testified byempirical
evidence, the motor aspects of the bodily self enable the inte-
gration of self-related multimodal sensory information about
the body and about the world the body interacts with. It is
also worth noting that emotions are motorically expressed
and, when observed, they may generate motor resonance in
the beholder, both at the levels of the face and body. Further-
more, the fact that somatosensory areas, such as SI and SII,
show evidence of ES during the first-person experience of
touch and its observation in others [44–48] shows how actions
and their sensory consequences are multimodally integrated
within a variety of brain areas whose unimodal specialization
and vocation is clearly challenged, if not totally disproved (for
a lengthier discussion of this point, see [98]).
Let us finally see how to reconcile the relationship between
ES and the vicarious experience of others as bodily selves it
supposedly generates and the necessity to keep self and
other distinct. The possibility of entertaining a pre-reflective,
experiential understanding of others by reusing our own
neural resources should not engender any confusion between
self and other. Indeed, others’ experiences, no matter how
they are shared and understood, are experienced as belonging
to others and not to the self. This poses no problem to the
model here delineated. First, the MM for movement actually
shows an asymmetric response profile during movement
execution and observation, with the former evoking stronger
activity ([11]; see also [99]). Second, an asymmetry in terms
of incomplete overlap between areas activated by the first-
person experience and the observation of others was observed
also in the domain of touch [47,48]. Actually, when self–other
distinctions blur, as in the case of first-episode schizophrenic
patients, such asymmetry is lost, as demonstrated by the lack
in deactivation of posterior insula these patients show
during the observation of affective touch on others’ bodies
[48]. Third, asymmetry in terms of brain connectivity discrimi-
nating between self and other was also revealed in the domain
of emotions [100]. All this evidence demonstrates that ES and
neural reuse do not imply self–other confusion. Intersubjectiv-
ity requires, on the one hand, shared neural networks
grounding an implicit understanding of others’ behaviours
and mental states, and, on the other, processes enabling one
to maintain a coherent and unique sense of self, allowing
for self–other discrimination. Intersubjectivity rests on the
possibility to conjugate identity and alterity.
7. Conclusion
The solution to the hotly debated issue of intersubjectivity
cannot be a forced choice between a third- and a second-
person perspective, because we constantly switch between
these two modes of inter-personal relation. If this holds to be
true, we should oppose the idea that a theoretical meta-
representational approach to the other is the sole/main key to
intersubjectivity. It appears more fruitful to explore the possi-
bility that the term ‘mindreading’
5 might qualify a variety of
epistemic approaches to the other. My proposal is to consider
mindreading, as conceived of in a broad sense, as a non-
meta-representational way of understanding others, basically
sharing a common crucial feature: the mapping of the other
onto the self, reciprocated by the mapping of the self on the
other. Mindreading as conceived of in a narrow sense
should instead qualify the type of explicit third-person
form of understanding we refer to when others’ behaviours
or mental states are opaque and ambiguous, thus requiring
explanations. Unfortunately, the classic approach to mind-
reading is to date unable to convincingly explain why a
series of brain areas, such as medial frontal areas and the tem-
poro-parietal junction, systematically activate during explicit
mentalizing tasks, besides making the tautological claim
that mindreading happens to be located there (for a detailed
discussion of this point, see [101], pp. 3–6). As argued by
Erwin Straus [6], Cartesian solipsism—and, one could add,
its contemporary heir, classic cognitivism—not only divides
the mind from the body, but also divides the self from the
world, perception from action and the I from the Thou.
Understanding others is a complex enterprise. At the very
least, it requires to represent which proximal and distal goals
others’ behaviour is directed to, others’ emotional state, the
identification of the beliefs, desires and intentions specifying
the reasons explaining why a given behaviour occurred and
the understanding of how those reasons are linked to agents
and to their behaviour. I posit that ES and the underpinning
MMs by means of neural reuse can constitutively account for
the representation of the motor goals of others’ actions by reus-
ing one’s own bodily formatted motor representations, as well
as of others’ emotions and sensations by reusing one’s own vis-
ceromotor and sensorimotor representations. ES can provide a
unified explanatory framework for mindreading as conceived
of in the broad sense specified above. Our bodily acting and
sensing nature appears to constitute the real transcendental
basis upon which our experience of the social world is built.
In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the discovery of
mirror neurons and the huge empirical research such discovery
generated in the following two decades allowed the start of
explaining basic aspects of intersubjectivity, like mindreading
in the broad sense as delineated here, on the basis of well-
documented neurophysiological mechanisms. The discovery
of mirror neurons, within the broader context of a new account
of the motor system demonstrating its cognitive role, allowed
the possibility to conceive intersubjectivity and social cognition
from a novel neuroscientific perspective that emphasizes the
crucial role of the acting body. Such a new perspective, in
turn, greatly contributed to revitalizing the notion of empathy
and the philosophical tradition that originally identified empa-
thy as a key element of human social intelligence, long
forgotten in the debate on human cognition. I am afraid
much work has still to be done to shed new light on the
neural mechanisms enabling cognitively more sophisticated
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also could be fruitfully pursued in this domain.
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Endnotes
1The notion of second person is used here compositionally and not in
the linguistic sense of being the addressee of our linguistic output.
2For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Pauen [73] and Schilbach
et al. [102].
3The transhypothalamic ‘reward’ system that is facilitated by dopa-
minergic circuits arising from the brainstem ventral tegmental area.
4A much more articulated anti-representationalist stance, also desig-
nated as ‘radical enactivism’, is heralded by the philosopher Dan
Hutto. However, the limited space and scope of this paper prevent
me from critically discussing it here.
5I use here the term ‘mindreading’ because it is almost universally
employed to refer to the human ability to understand others’ expres-
sive behaviour and the causes and reasons producing it. However, I
do not commit myself to the notion that understanding others just
consists of literally ‘reading their minds’.
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